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I Articles I
The Outrageous God: Emotional Distress,
Tort Liability, and the Limits of Religious
Advocacy
Jeffrey Shulman*
When Matthew Snyder died fighting for his country, his memory
was celebrated, and his loss mourned.1 The Westboro Baptist Church
conducted a celebration of a different kind by picketing near Matthew's
funeral service.2  The church held signs that read, "You are going to
hell," "God hates you," "Thank God for dead soldiers," and "Semper fi
fags."3  In the weeks following the funeral, the church posted on its
* Associate Professor, Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown University Law
Center. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-
Madison. This article was supported by a grant from the Georgetown University Law
Center. I would like to thank my colleagues at the Law Center for their efforts on my
behalf. Michael Seidman and Steven Goldberg have been a continual source of guidance
and encouragement. I am also grateful to Robin West for her enthusiastic support of my
research. I am especially thankful for the hard work of my (2007-2008) 1L students, who
struggled mightily, and with good grace, with many of this article's principal (and most
perplexing) concerns, and for the dedication of the truly stellar group of law fellows
(Rupal Doshi, Kevin Glandon, Catherine Grealis, Molly Gulland, Sonia Ignatova, and
Benjamin Vaughn) who ensured that the struggle was such a productive one.
1. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571-72 (D. Md. 2008).
2. Id. at 569-70.
3. Id. at 570.
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website, godhatesfags.com, an "epic" entitled "The Burden of Marine
Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder.",4 Matthew's burden, as the church saw it,
was that he had been "raised for the devil" and "taught to defy God.
' 5
Matthew's father, Albert Snyder, brought a civil action against the
Westboro Baptist Church in federal district court, asserting a claim for
intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress (among other
causes of action).6 He was awarded $10.9 million in compensatory and
punitive damages.
That judgment, as such judgments against religious entities are wont
to do, occasioned protest from First Amendment advocates concerned
that, under the open-ended standard of outrageousness, "[l]iability easily
ends up turning on how much juries condemn the speaker's viewpoint."8
Cautioned by the Supreme Court that "'[o]utrageousness' in the area of
political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it," 9
4. Id. at 569-70.
5. Id. at 570.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 569. Snyder originally brought suit on five counts: defamation, intrusion
upon seclusion, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and civil conspiracy. The court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on
the claims for defamation and publicity given to private life. Id. at 572-73. The court
held, however, that the remaining claims raised genuine issues of material fact. Id. at
573. The case is now on appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. The Westboro Baptist Church has been involved in similar suits. See Phelps-
Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying preliminary injunction against
statute that criminalized picketing of funeral service or procession); Phelps-Roper v. Taft,
523 F. Supp. 2d 612 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (upholding as narrowly tailored portion of state
statute creating fixed buffer zone within which picketing of funeral service was
prohibited; striking down as constitutionally overbroad portion of same statute creating a
floating buffer zone), affd, Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, No. 07-3600, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18017 (6th Cir. 2008); St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church,
921 P.2d 821 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding preliminary injunction against picketing
house of worship), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997).
8. Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/
chain_119447952 1.shtml (November 7, 2007, 19:02); see also, posting of Sam Bayard to
Citizen Media Law Project, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2007/snyder-v-phelps-
westboro-verdict-criticized-unconstitutional (Nov. 13, 2007) (arguing that application of
intrusion tort to Westboro's picketing activities is constitutionally impermissible). See
generally, Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths, " 34 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 579 (1993) (open nature of emotional distress tort claim threatens
religious freedom and diversity).
9. Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) ("If it were possible by laying down a
principled standard to separate [outrageous speech] from [protected speech], public
discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any such
standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description 'outrageous' does not
supply one. 'Outrageousness' in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the
jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression.
An 'outrageousness' standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow
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courts hearing outrage suits are on guard against breaches of objectivity
that would disadvantage minority religions. However, to avoid the
appearance of religious viewpoint discrimination, judges often resort to
fine, almost scholastic, distinctions between what is secular and what is
religious; between what is central to a religion's belief and practices and
what is theologically insignificant; and, even more tenuously, between
what is belief and what is conduct. This is caution to a fault. These
distinctions have produced a results-oriented jurisprudence that,
paradoxically, involves the courts in precisely the kind of entanglement
with religious affairs they seek to avoid, and does so while leaving ill
defined the threshold that separates protected religious advocacy from
religiously motivated conduct subject to tort liability.
This essay argues that emotional distress claims are well suited to
suggest the outer limits of civil tolerance for religious advocacy.10 Such
tort suits serve socially valuable punitive and prophylactic functions,
providing vulnerable individuals with a remedy against the most
offensive and intrusive forms of religious conduct. That protection
need not come at the cost of constitutional privilege for religious entities.
Where no intra-church dispute is involved, the only question a court is
obligated, and entitled, to consider is whether the religious entity's
conduct was of a type that no decent society should tolerate. Tort
liability is not premised on the judgment that a religious belief is
somehow "fundamentally flawed"12 or not worthy of constitutional
damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional
impact on the audience.") (alterations in original).
10. For cases involving other types of tort suits against religious entities, see Carl H.
Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment
Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 76-91 (1986). See generally Alan Stephens,
Annotation, Free Exercise of Religion Clause of First Amendment as Defense to Tort
Liability, 93 A.L.R. FED. 754 (1989); Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Liability of
Religious Association for Damages for Intentionally Tortious Conduct in Recruitment,
Indoctrination, or Related Activity, 40 A.L.R. 4th 1062 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Howard 0. Hunter and Polly J. Price, Regulation of Religious
Proselytism in the United States, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 537, 555-56 (2001) ("Tort law is
frequently said to preserve public order by providing a dispute resolution mechanism
when private persons believe themselves to have been harmed by other individuals or
groups."); cf Hayden, supra note 8, at 580 ("The law of torts is a powerful weapon in
society's suppression of intolerable activities; its doctrines are flexible and open-ended
and the contours of those doctrines often are filled in by juries rather than by legal elites.
Tort law is thus extraordinarily responsive to and reflective of societal mores, and serves
a useful function in allowing persons who are harmed by another's actions to sue to
recover damages for their injuries, judged by a common-sense standard of social
tolerance.").
12. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, 571 N.E.2d 340, 348 (Mass. 1991)
(vacating judgment on emotional distress claim against religious organization because
"[i]nherent in the claim that exposure to [defendant's] religious beliefs causes tortious
emotional damage is the notion that the disputed beliefs are fundamentally flawed").
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protection. To the contrary, whether religious advocacy was meant to
and did inflict severe emotional distress is a question that can be
adjudicated by the neutral and generally applicable principles of tort
law. 1
3
Of course, emotional distress suits based on religious conduct may
test the factfinder's objectivity, but that much is true by definition of all
outrageous conduct cases, religious or secular. Indeed, because the bar
an emotional distress claimant must hurdle is a high one, 14 such cases
provide a way to establish limitations on religious freedom-"limitations
which of necessity bound religious freedom"15-that need not infringe
upon individual religious rights or the institutional autonomy of religious
entities. This essay proposes that the specter of subjectivity can be
alleviated by permitting emotional distress suits only where religious
advocacy personally targets a captive and private listener. Such a
standard leaves alone the area of political and social discourse, 16 and
even in the area of private discourse it places on the listener the burden
of avoiding offense, if possible.17 This standard goes a long way toward
13. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
879 (1990) ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability ... ' (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)));
see also, e.g., Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997) (finding that "there
is no question that the principles of tort law, at issue, are both neutral and generally
applicable"); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431-32 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (First
Amendment does not bar tort claim against church defendants because claim can be
assessed applying neutral principles of law); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp.
1138, 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (no constitutional bar to adjudication of tort claim because
"'neutral' principles of law can be applied without determining underlying questions of
church law and policies" (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696 (1976))); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo. 1993) (First
Amendment does not bar civil suit because deciding claims does "not require interpreting
or weighing church doctrine and neutral principles of law can be applied"); Fortin v.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208, 1225 (Me. 2005) ("[C]ourts do not
inhibit the free exercise of religion by applying neutral principles of law to a civil dispute
involving members of the clergy."); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 45-46 (1990) (adjudication of emotional distress cases applies
neutral rules); cf. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) (applying "neutral-principles
approach" to dispute over ownership of church property does not inhibit free exercise of
religion); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (same).
14. See Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 348. See generally Esbeck, supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
15. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring in the
judgment).
16. See Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); see also infra Part II.A.
17. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (persons confronted with
defendant's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" could effectively "avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes").
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guaranteeing both the freedom to disseminate a religious message and
the freedom to walk away from unwanted religious advocacy.
Part I of this essay argues that it is entirely consistent with legal
precedent and longstanding social policy to hold religious groups liable
in tort when their religious advocacy subjects others to extreme mental or
emotional distress. The courts generally agree that only those who freely
choose to unite themselves in religious association are subject to that
entity's governance. 18  Religious entities are not protected when they
impose their will on those unwilling to submit to it. 19 Thus, once a
member withdraws consent,2° or where a religious entity has undermined
a member's capacity to consent, 21 the constitutional shield that protects
religious conduct from judicial inquiry is broken.22
However, basing a theory of liability on associative voluntariness
23
raises a host of difficult secondary questions. Must religious entities
obtain consent before engaging in aggressive religious advocacy? How
much information must a religious recruit have to make a truly informed
choice? When is a religious recruit rendered incapable of autonomous
decision-making? Do children (or other psychologically vulnerable
persons) who are subject to religious indoctrination freely choose to unite
18. See infra Part 1.
19. See, e.g., Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 781 (Okla. 1989)
("[T]he First Amendment will not shield a church from civil liability for imposing its
will, as manifested through a disciplinary scheme, upon an individual who has not
consented to undergo ecclesiastical discipline.").
20. See, e.g., id. ("Parishioner voluntarily joined the Church of Christ and by so
doing consented to submit to its tenets. When she later removed herself from
membership, Parishioner withdrew her consent, depriving the Church of the power
actively to monitor her spiritual life through overt disciplinary acts."); cf Bear v.
Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa. 1975) (reversing dismissal of tort
suit by former member of church). But cf Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of
N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that members of church were free not to
associate with former member).
21. See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity,
762 P.2d 46, 56-63 (Cal. 1988) (reversing summary judgment for church on emotional
distress claim where atmosphere of coercive persuasion rendered plaintiffs incapable of
deciding not to join church); Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 66 Cal. Rptr.
2d. 1, 7-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming emotional distress judgment for plaintiff
where church conducted religious practices in coercive environment).
22. See, e.g., Guinn, 775 P.2d at 776 ("No real freedom to choose religion would
exist in this land if under the shield of the First Amendment religious institutions could
impose their will on the unwilling and claim immunity from secular judicature for their
tortious acts.").
23. On the question of consent in the context of religious advocacy, see, for
example, Richard Delgado, Cults and Conversion: The Case for Informed Consent, 16
GA. L. REv. 533 (1982); Comment, Religious Torts: Applying the Consent Doctrine as
Definitional Balancing, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 949 (1986). On consent to religious
deprogramming, see Douglas H. Cook, Comment, Tort Liability for Cult
Deprogramming: Peterson v. Sorlien, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 465, 481-89 (1982).
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themselves in voluntary association? The open-ended nature of
emotional distress claims and the grounding of liability on amorphous
principles of self-determination preclude a formulaic response to tough
cases. Put simply, the decision to hold a religious entity liable for a tort
24
action is a challenging one.
Part II of this essay proposes that a "captive or unwilling listener"
doctrine may help define those cases where religious advocacy or
indoctrination goes too far.25 In Part II.A, this essay looks at the Snyder
case and considers how the court, by relying on the Supreme Court's
cases establishing "[t]he right to avoid unwelcome speech, ' 26 could have
1) more clearly defined the boundaries of the church's liability, and
24. See, e.g., Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, 571 N.E.2d 340, 349-50 (Mass.
1991) ("The decision whether the free exercise clause bars a particular tort action is not
necessarily determined by the presence of tortious activity but by other factors such as the
nature of the evidence which must be presented to support such a claim, or the effect that
liability for a successful claim would have on free exercise rights.").
25. On the captive audience doctrine, see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-18
(2000) (upholding statute that prohibited speakers from approaching unwilling listeners
outside health care facilities); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994)
(targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens psychological well-being of the patient
held "captive" by medical circumstance); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)
(residential privacy protects the "unwilling listener" from unwanted and intrusive
speech); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(describing the psychological tensions and pressures that result from targeted residential
picketing); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("Patently offensive,
indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public,
but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970))); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10
(1975) (noting that restrictions on speech are warranted when the degree of captivity
"makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure"); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (riders on city transit system are captive
audience); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ("We therefore
categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the Constitution or
otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another. If this prohibition
operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to
press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient. That we are often 'captives' outside
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not
mean we must be captives everywhere." (citing Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451 (1952))); Pollak, 343 U.S. at 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (riders on
street railway and bus system are captive audience); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-
87 (1949) (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939)) ("The unwilling listener
is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made
to take it."); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) (viewers of display
advertising on billboards and street car placards have messages thrust upon them
"without the exercise of choice or volition on their part"); cf Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (persons confronted with defendant's jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft" could have avoided "further bombardment of their sensibilities simply
by averting their eyes"); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th Cir. 1978) (residents
could "simply avoid" Nazi-affiliated protest activities).
26. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716.
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2) set appropriate limits on its right to express and disseminate religious
doctrine. It is difficult to imagine a time and place where the state's
interest in protecting its citizens' privacy applies with greater force than
the momentary sanctuary afforded the family in mourning.27 In Part II.B,
this essay argues that because children are unable freely to choose a
religious association-because, in other words, children are "like a
captive audience, 28 subject to someone else's will-their indoctrination
must be consistent with well-settled principles of psychological
development. When religious entities veer far from such principles, they
should incur civil liability for emotionally abusive advocacy. The tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress provides a remedy for the
most egregious forms of behavior that impair a "child's emotional
development or sense of self-worth,, 29 and, because it provides a remedy
only for the most egregious forms of misconduct, there is little risk that
the adjudication of such suits will unduly restrict religious freedom.
Constraining religious advocacy that is truly outrageous offers a
measure of civility to govern the marketplace of religious ideas.3 ° Some
brake on indoctrination of religious belief is necessary to guarantee a
civil space for religious diversity, and to ensure room in the public
27. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 618 (N.D. Ohio 2007)
(state "has a significant interest in protecting its citizens from disruption during the
events associated with a funeral or burial service"); McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp.
2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (funeral attendees have an interest in avoiding unwanted
communications "which is at least similar to a person's interest in avoiding such
communications inside his home"); cf Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541
U.S. 157, 168 (2004) ("Family members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their
own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased
person who was once their own."). But see Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 486
(8th Cir. 2007) (no significant state interest in protecting funeral attendees).
28. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("[A] State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely
delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that
full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees.") (footnote omitted).
29. The definition of "child abuse and neglect" under the federal Child Abuse and
Prevention Treatment Act of 1996 (CAPTA) includes serious emotional harm. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106g (2007). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services defines emotional
abuse as "a pattern of behavior that impairs a child's emotional development or sense of
self-worth. This may include constant criticism, threats, or rejection, as well as
withholding love, support, or guidance." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, WHAT IS CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT?, 3 (2008), available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/whatiscan.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (noting that, at time of
adoption of Constitution, there was widespread awareness of "anguish, hardship and
bitter strife" that can come with zealous religious rivalries); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of
Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947) (describing "turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions"
generated by religious sects).
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square for religious minorities. While "[r]eligious activities which
concern only members of the faith are and ought to be free-as nearly
absolutely free as anything can be, 31 tort liability protects the rights of
others to choose religious belief or to choose none at all. Far from
threatening the expressive liberty of religious entities, the limitations
created by tort liability work to ensure a civic order where all people are
equally free to express their deepest beliefs, whether that freedom lies in
the fight to disseminate religious belief or in the right to avoid unwanted
and offensive religious advocacy.
I
The Constitution requires tolerance of religious differences. Under
the Free Exercise Clause, "many types of. . . belief can develop
unmolested and unobstructed., 32  In effect, the Free Exercise Clause
embodies a non-molestation principle guaranteeing "the right to organize
voluntary religious associations. 33  Those who belong to a religious
association consent to submit to its polity and practices and, for this
reason, as the Supreme Court held in Watson v. Jones, religious entities
enjoy a constitutional shield against some judicial inquiries:
The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the
expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create
tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual
members, congregations, and officers within the general association,
is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with
an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.
But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion
of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their
decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.34
31. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring in the
judgment).
32. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
33. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871). Colonial charters reflected this non-
molestation principle "[by] protect[ing] residents from being in any way 'molested,
punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinion, in matters of
religion."' City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 551 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting RHODE ISLAND CHARTER OF 1667); cf Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev.
Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 174 (P. Ford
ed. 1898) ("1 consider the government of the United States as interdicted by the
Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or
exercises."); Letter from James Madison to Reverend Adams, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 487 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (religious liberty requires "entire
abstinence of the Govt. from interference" with internal affairs of religious
organizations).
34. 80 U.S. at 728-29.
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First promulgated in 1878, the doctrine of Watson v. Jones has
enjoyed a lengthy and influential career.35 When civil courts undertake
to resolve ecclesiastical controversies, the Court repeatedly has made
caution its jurisprudential watchword.36 In such circumstances, "the
hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious
doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely
ecclesiastical concern. 37  These hazards arise when courts seek to
determine what is religiously normative-in other words, when courts try
to resolve controversies about the theological correctness of doctrine and
practice.38 With no neutral principles of law to settle such matters,39 the
35. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952);
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929).
36. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602 ("[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil
courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and
practice."); Serbian E. Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 724-25 ("[T]he First and Fourteenth
Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and
regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating
disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are
created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the
Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them."); Hull
Church, 393 U.S. at 449 ("First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church
property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over
religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in
order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free
development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely
ecclesiastical concern."); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 ("The opinion [in Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872)] radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well
as those of faith and doctrine."); Watson, 80 U.S. at 728-79; see also United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (courts will not inquire as to the truth or sincerity of religious
beliefs). On judicial authority to resolve religious questions, see, for example, Jared A.
Goldstein, Is There a Religious Question Doctrine?: Judicial Authority to Examine
Religious Practices and Belief 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497 (2005); Kent Greenawalt,
Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with
Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the
Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85 (1997). For consideration of the state's interest in religious
questions, see Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in
the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645 (2004) ("[I]t is precisely
because secular, liberal, democratic governments have an 'interest' in the content, and
therefore in the 'development,' of religious doctrine-an interest that such governments
will, if permitted, quite understandably pursue-that religious freedom is so fragile.").
37. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
38. On the distinction between normative and positive religious questions, see
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36.
39. Where the resolution of complaints against religious entities can be made on
objective, hence neutral, grounds, the rationale for judicial abstention is absent. See, e.g.,
2008]
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risk is necessarily great that factfinders will impose their own ideas of
correctness, a risk that may well justify fear of judicial subjectivity.40
It is often assumed that disputes between a church and its members
require the courts to settle normative religious questions. Thus, where a
plaintiff has freely chosen to adhere to a religious entity, courts show a
reasonable reluctance to adjudicate tort claims based on religiously
motivated conduct (and a reasonable reliance on the plaintiffs volitional
capacities).41 Most obviously, action taken by a religious entity against a
current member may be constitutionally protected,42 provided that such
conduct does not "constitute a sufficient threat to the peace, safety, or
morality of the community as to warrant state intervention. 4 3  The
fullest elucidation of this principle may be that of the Oklahoma
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602 (approving "neutral principles of law" approach to church
property dispute); Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449 (same).
40. In Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, the Court indicated its
readiness to intervene in cases involving "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness" on the part of
church authorities. 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929). The arbitrariness exception to the rule of
judicial abstention suggested that courts could employ neutral principles of law to
determine whether a religious entity had complied with it own rules and regulations.
That proposition was rejected by the Court in Serbian Eastern Orthodox: "For civil
courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in that
sense 'arbitrary' must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or
ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else in to the
substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question.
But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of such an
exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the
proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical
decisions of church tribunals as it finds them." 426 U.S. at 713.
41. See, e.g., Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 773 (Okla.
1989) ("When people voluntarily join together in pursuit of spiritual fulfillment, the First
Amendment requires that the government respect their decision and not impose its own
ideas on the religious organization.").
42. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883
(9th Cir. 1987) ("Courts generally do not scrutinize closely the relationship among
members.., of a church."); cf Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World
Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (dismissing emotional
distress action against religious entity because church member "chose to subject himself
to the church's discipline"). But not all religiously motivated conduct is protected even if
it is based on the consent of current members. See generally Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding conviction for violation of child labor laws); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding constitutionality of law requiring
vaccinations for communicable diseases); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(upholding law against polygamy). Of course, religious entities are held liable for secular
conduct. See generally Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241 (Cal. 1951) (holding religious
corporation liable for employee's negligent driving).
43. Paul, 819 F.2d at 883. To what extent such provisos have historically qualified
the principle that religious entities are subject to neutral laws has been the subject of
robust debate. Compare City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 539-40 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part) (provisos negated license to act in violation of neutral laws), with id.
at 552-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (provisos would be superfluous unless right of free
exercise was viewed as generally superior to ordinary legislation).
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Supreme Court, which, in Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, used
the member/non-member distinction to delineate the proper boundaries
between civil and ecclesiastical spheres of adjudicatory authority.44 In
Guinn, church elders carried out a biblically-mandated disciplinary
procedure against the plaintiff, a parishioner who, it was rumored, was
having sexual relations in violation of the denomination's code of
ethics. 45 When the plaintiff discovered that the elders intended to tell the
congregation about her private affairs, she sought to end her affiliation
with the church.46 She implored the elders to inform the congregation
only that she had withdrawn from membership.47 In response to the
plaintiffs requests, she was told that withdrawal from church fellowship
was "doctrinally impossible"48: "The Church of Christ believes that all
its members are a family,- one can be born into a family but can never
truly withdraw from it. A Church of Christ member can voluntarily join
the church's flock but cannot then disassociate oneself from it.
4 9
Publicly denounced as a fornicator, the plaintiff sued for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.5°
The Guinn court was Solomonic in setting the parameters of judicial
authority to resolve civil disputes against religious entities. For the
court, ecclesiastical discipline (that is, "[t]he right to express
dissatisfaction with the disobedience of those who have promised to
adhere to doctrinal precepts and to take ecclesiastically-mandated
measures to bring wayward members back within the bounds of accepted
behavior"5 ) amounts to intra-church activity protected by the Free
Exercise Clause; accordingly, the church was immune from tort claims
for its conduct prior to the parishioner's withdrawal.52 But, the church
was not shielded from scrutiny "for imposing its will, as manifested
through a disciplinary scheme, upon an individual who has not consented
to undergo ecclesiastical discipline. 53 Further, the right "to recede from
one's religious allegiance" is also constitutionally protected.54 Consent
to submit to governance by religious authority does not equate with
"consent to relinquishing a right which the civil law guarantees. 55 In
44. See Guinn, 775 P.2d at 786.
45. Id. at 767-68.
46. Id. at 769.
47. Id. at 768.
48. Id. at 769 (italics in original).
49. Id. (italics in original).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 779.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 781.
54. Id. at 776.
55. Id. at 777.
2008]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
short, the plaintiff was as free to leave the church as she was to join it.
While the Free Exercise Clause mandates judicial deference to the
adjudicatory provenance of religious authorities, "the constitutionally
protected freedom to impose even the most deeply felt, spiritually-
inspired disciplinary measure is forfeited when the object of 'benevolent'
concern is one who has terminated voluntary submission to another's
supervision and command. 56  For the Guinn court, the member/non-
member distinction is a jurisdictional threshold, one that provides courts,
if not a bright line, at least a real measure of clarity in deciding whether
to hear tort suits against religious entities.57
It is well settled, then, that the First Amendment does not require
non-members-that is, those who choose not to submit to the authority
of a religious association-to "be tolerant of that group's attempts to
govern them., 58 No court has suggested that religious entities can treat
non-members as though they had consented to ecclesiastical governance
and discipline. Implicating no intra-church concerns, tort suits by non-
members do not raise normative religious questions; thus, religious
entities need no immunity from such claims, even when they arise out of
religiously motivated conduct. 59 Nothing in the adjudication of tort suits
56. Id. at 779.
57. Thus, the court remanded "to separate on review [plaintiffs] recovery for the
injury occasioned her by the prewithdrawal acts from that which stems from
postwithdrawal harm." Id. at 786. Not all courts would agree that disciplinary measures
taken against former members are constitutionally unprotected. In Paul v. Watchtower
Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held
that the practice of shunning is protected activity whether directed at current or former
members. Here too, however, the principle of consent was at work. The court noted that
a constitutional defense to tort liability was particularly appropriate in that the plaintiff
was a former church member, presumably because membership implied consent to post-
resignation discipline. Id. The Guinn court distinguished Paul on the ground that
shunning is an essentially passive activity, a punishment that is "merely a reiteration of
[the plaintiffs] prior rejection, not an active attempt to involve her in the religious
practices of a church whose precepts she no longer followed." Guinn, 775 P.2d at 780.
58. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 779.
59. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1135
(D. Mass. 1982) (tort liability may be upheld "even if the alleged wrongdoer acts upon a
religious belief or is organized for a religious purpose"); Turner v. Unification Church,
473 F. Supp. 367, 371-72 (D.R.I. 1978) (religious activities not solely in "ideological or
intellectual realm" are subject to tort liability); see also Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New
England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 347 (Mass. 1991) ("[R]eligiously motivated activity is not
categorically immunized from tort liability by the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment."); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 57 (Cal. 1988) (courts will
recognize tort liability even for acts that are religiously motivated); Hester v. Barnett, 723
S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (torts of a cleric are actionable, even though
incidents of religious practice and belief) (citing Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church,
341 A.2d 105, 108 (Pa. 1975)); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World
Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (church may be held liable
for tortious conduct, even if that conduct is carried out as part of the church's religious
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against religious entities requires a court to retreat from "the foundational
rule" that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from intervening in
internal ecclesiastical disputes.6°
The case law on judicial abstention is driven by the concern that
courts will entangle themselves in ecclesiastical questions, the settlement
of which more properly belongs to those authorities granted adjudicatory
responsibility by church members. But, tort claims do not necessarily
ask the Court to render a decision about "discipline, faith, internal
organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law," 61 to "second-guess
ecclesiastical decisions made by hierarchical church bodies, '62 or to
determine "the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text."63 Nor
is the adjudication of such claims likely to demand a judgment about the
truth or falsity of religious belief.64 The rationale for judicial abstention
is especially weak when the court is not called upon to resolve an intra-
church dispute.65 Where controversy is concerned with the conformity of
religiously motivated acts to church doctrine, it makes good sense for
courts to let ecclesiastical authorities settle the matter. But where a
plaintiff seeks relief for harms suffered as a result of conduct that is
presumably consistent with the governing law of a religious entity, the
interests protected by judicial abstention are not endangered.66 In such
practices); Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d 132, 137 (Wash. 1966) (church members not
entitled, "under the guise of exercising religious beliefs," to interfere wrongfully with
familial relationships).
60. Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (Mass. 1985) (quoting Alberts v.
Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 122 (Mass. 1985)).
61. Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976)).
62. Serbian E. Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 724-25.
63. Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 878 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1987).
64. See generally United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). But see Pleasant
Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, No. 05-0916, 2008 WL 2572009, at *8 (Tex. June
27, 2008) (assessing emotional damages against church for engaging in religious practice
of "laying hands" would unconstitutionally "embroil this Court in an assessment of the
propriety of those religious beliefs") (citing Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-88). While the rule
of Ballard would seem to offer poor fodder for literary exploitation, one episode of the
television series Law & Order features a homicide defendant who offers as a justification
defense his belief that God would strike dead his daughter if the deceased continued to
teach her "godless" evolutionary theory. See Law & Order: Good Faith (NBC television
broadcast March 30, 2007). When the state objects to the defense, the court declares that
it is no business of the judiciary to judge the veracity of the defendant's belief in divine
retribution. See id.
65. See Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 439 U.S. 1355, 1373
(1978) (Rehnquist, Cir. J.) (judicial abstention is "premised on a perceived danger that in
resolving intrachurch disputes the State will become entangled in essentially religious
controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs").
66. Paul, 819 F.2d at 878 n.l (where plaintiff seeks relief for harms suffered as a
result of conduct that is presumably consistent with governing law of religious entity,
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cases, the "justification for judicial abstention is nonexistent" because the
dispute does not relate to ecclesiastical affairs; 67 and because the dispute
is not an ecclesiastical one, its outcome can be determined by neutral
principles of tort law. To the extent that religious entities are held
responsible for their misconduct, the burden they suffer is "merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision,"
the enforcement of which by civil adjudicature does not offend the Free
Exercise Clause.68
Obligating religious entities not to commit outrageous acts, and
judging outrageousness by neutral standards, is far more supportable than
the constitutional hair-splitting in which courts routinely indulge to avoid
the appearance of meddling with religious matters. Courts tread warily
when religious entities are sued-indeed, too warily, for in their struggle
to avoid infringing upon religious activity, courts end up making dubious
judgments about matters that border theological territory: what is
religious as opposed to secular conduct, what is central to a religion's
beliefs and practices (and the restriction of which would be a substantial
burden) as opposed to what is not a significant religious imperative, and
what is belief as opposed to conduct. In cases involving emotional
distress claims, however, none of these vexing questions really needs to
be asked. The focus of the court's inquiry should be solely on the same
factors that determine the resolution of claims involving secular entities.
The danger of religious viewpoint discrimination emerges, paradoxically,
when too much attention is paid to the religious status of the defendant.
"doctrine of Serbian E. Orthodox does not apply"); cf Guinn v. Church of Christ of
Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 773 (Okla. 1989) ("Parishioner did not attack the Elders'
disciplinary actions on the basis that they contravened established Church of Christ
polity. Rather, she claimed that the Elders' actions-whether or not in conformity to
established church doctrine-amounted to a tortious invasion of her rights for which she
was entitled to recover. While this dispute involved a religiously-founded disciplinary
matter, it was not the sort of private ecclesiastical controversy which the Court has
deemed immune from judicial scrutiny.").
67. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 773 (where controversy is concerned with tortious nature of
religiously motivated acts and not with their conformity to church doctrine, "justification
for judicial abstention is nonexistent").
68. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878
(1990). This is, or should be, the lesson of Smith. Where pre-Smith courts did not
abstain from consideration of tort suits against religious entities, they generally employed
some form of compelling interest test. See, e.g., Guinn, 775 P.2d at 771 n.16 (equating
compelling governmental interest with a threat to "public safety, peace, or order"
(quoting Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963))); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762
P.2d 46, 56-57 (Cal. 1988) ("Government action burdening religious conduct is subject to
a balancing test, in which the importance of the state's interest is weighed against the
severity of the burden imposed on religion. The greater the burden imposed on religion,
the more compelling must be the government interest at stake.") (citations omitted).
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When courts choose to impose tort liability on religious entities,
they often do so by finding that the misconduct is entirely secular, 69 or, if
religious, not part of (or, worse, not a central part of) the religious
teachings of the defendant, 70 and, thus, prohibition of that conduct is no
burden on free exercise. It would have been easy enough for the
Snyder v. Phelps court to say that targeted verbal abuse is not religious
conduct or that it is not part of (or a central part of) the teaching and
practices of the Westboro Baptist Church. But, this type of inquiry does
entangle the court in a theological debate about the meaning of religion
or the doctrine of specific faiths. We may all agree that negligently
driving a church school bus is not a religiously mandated activity,72 but
the question whether engagement in personal invective is a defendant's
religious obligation is not so easily answered. It may well be.73 Who is
to say that restricting a church's recruiting practices imposes burdens that
"while real, are not substantial, 74 or that requiring a father to "limit
sharing certain aspects of his beliefs with his children" imposes "only a
minimal burden" on his right to practice his religion freely?75
69. For instance, sexual misconduct cases are generally treated as involving non-
religious conduct. See, e.g., Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336
(5th Cir. 1998) (activities complained of by the plaintiffs were not rooted in defendant's
religious belief). See generally Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988)
(same).
70. Whenever courts consider "the severity of the burden imposed on religion,"
Molko, 762 P.2d at 56, they do so despite the Supreme Court's admonition that that it "is
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith," Hemandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). See also
Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Judging the centrality of different
religious practices is akin to the unacceptable 'business of evaluating the relative merits
of differing religious claims."' (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2
(1983))).
71. See, e.g., Molko, 762 P.2d at 60 ("Being subject to liability for fraud does not in
any way or degree prevent or inhibit Church members from operating their religious
communities, worshipping as they see fit, freely associating with one another, selling or
distributing literature, proselytizing on the street, soliciting funds, or generally spreading
Reverend Moon's message among the population.... At most, it potentially closes one
questionable avenue for bringing new members into the Church.") (citation omitted);
Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Mass. 1997) (court order limiting father
from sharing "certain aspects" of his religious beliefs with his children imposes only a
minimal burden on free exercise).
72. Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 244 (Cal. 1951). Unless, of course, it is. See
infra note 73.
73. Cf Destefano, 763 P.2d at 284 (if clergy member asserted that sexual
misconduct "was dictated by his sincerely held religious beliefs or was consistent with
the practice of his religion, [the court] would have to resolve a difficult first amendment
issue"); see also Sanders, 134 F.3d at 338 n.7 (noting that court did not decide whether
the "First Amendment would protect a minister asserting that his civil misconduct was
rooted in religious belief") (emphasis in original).
74. Molko, 762 P.2d at 60.
75. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d at 1236.
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When courts choose not to impose tort liability on religious entities,
they often hide behind the rationale that such liability would infringe
belief as opposed to conduct. 76  This reasoning, despite its good
pedigree,77 involves distinctions even more tenuous than those that
purport to separate religious from secular conduct. The state has no
"window into men's souls, '78 and the absolute freedom to believe is in
little need of constitutional guarantee.79 What needs protection is
conduct, the right to practice what one believes. The right of free
exercise has always meant more than the right to believe. Jefferson
understood it to mean that government could not "restrain the profession
or propagation of [religious] principles. ' 80 If religious freedom leaves
"all men.., free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion
in matters of religion," 81 then it is disingenuous-and certainly of little
comfort to religious entities-for a court to say that it is not penalizing
belief when it subjects religious advocates to tort liability. 82
It is not uncommon for courts adjudicating civil complaints against
religious entities to make both kinds of mistake-that is, they judge
whether, or to what extent, conduct has religious significance and,
subsequently, whether restriction of such conduct substantially burdens
76. See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, No. 05-0916, 2008 WL
2572009, at *7 (Tex. June 27, 2008) (adjudication of emotional distress claim "would
necessarily require an inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs that is forbidden
by the Constitution" (quoting Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 682 (Tex. 1996)));
Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 347-48 (Mass. 1991)
("[T]he defendant has been required to do what the First Amendment has forbidden; it
has been forced to attempt to prove to a jury that the substance of its religious beliefs is
worthy of respect.").
77. See generally Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
78. The quotation "I would make no windows into men's souls" is attributed to
Queen Elizabeth I. See WINSTON CHURCHILL, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
PEOPLES II, 82-83 (1963).
79. See Cantwell, 310 U.S at 303-04 ("[The Free Exercise Clause] embraces two
concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be.").
80. Thomas Jefferson, The Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, in THE
VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES FOR
AMERICAN HISTORY, xvii (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988)
(emphasis added).
81. Id. at xviii.
82. Cf Hayden, supra note 8 at 611 ("Unless and until the government is able to
read its citizens' minds, the govermnent can act against a mere belief only when that
belief motivates some action-reading, speaking, moving one's body, and so forth. Only
then is the belief apparent, and only by striking at conduct that is motivated by that belief
can one attack the belief itself. Thus the belief/action distinction is little more than a
truism and fails to provide a meaningful guidepost with which to decide hard questions.")
(footnote omitted).
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religious conduct. In Alberts v. Devine,83 the church defendants argued
that because an ecclesiastical rule required them to seek out private
medical information, any judicial inquiry into their actions (that allegedly
violated physician-patient confidentiality) was constitutionally barred.84
The court held, correctly in my view, that even if a rule imposed upon
church authorities a duty to secure confidential medical information, the
First Amendment does not preclude the imposition of liability for
violations of physician-patient confidentiality.85 But the court arrived at
this conclusion by deciding that "the dispute [was not] about religious
faith or doctrine nor about church discipline or internal organization" 86
and that "a rule that prevents interference with physician-patient
relationships will have little impact on the free exercise of religion. 87
Thus, like courts before and after it, 88 the Alberts court reached the
conclusion that judicial abstention was not warranted by engaging in
precisely the type of inquiry about religious questions that most warrants
judicial abstention.89
The better approach is to view religious advocacy, whether we call
it belief or conduct, as subject to the legal standards of tort law. If the
legal question can be settled without requiring the court to 1) referee an
intra-church dispute, or 2) pass judgment on the truth or falsity, or the
relative merits, of religious belief, and if the matter can be resolved in a
non-discriminatory manner,90 the fact that ecclesiastical rule mandates
the conduct-that is, the fact that conduct is religiously significant and
restriction of that conduct is substantially burdensome-is beside the
point. Indeed, given the unique social and psychological volatility of
disagreement about religious imperatives, 9 advocacy that bears the
imprimatur of religious doctrine or belief may be more subject to the
limits created by tort liability than similar secular conduct.92  Those
83. 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985).
84. Id. at 122.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 123.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 69-82.
89. Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 123.
90. If a law is not religiously neutral and of general application, it must be shown to
serve a compelling governmental interest and to be narrowly tailored to advance that
interest. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993).
91. See supra note 30.
92. On the other hand, emotional distress claims must satisfy an objective standard;
thus, some religiously motivated practices that might seem intolerable in a secular
context may not rise to the requisite level of outrageousness. For example, in George v.
I.S.K.Con., 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 236 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1989), the appellate
court, which reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff on an emotional
distress claim, reached its decision by comparing the defendant church's conduct to that
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limits operate whenever religious activities "begin to affect or collide
with liberties of others or of the public. 93 As the Snyder v. Phelps court
put it (relying on Guinn), religious entities are not free to "impose their
will on the unwilling and claim immunity from secular judicature for
their tortious acts."94
II
First Amendment freedoms of expression have long been tied to the
Supreme Court's sense of constitutional geography. Though "jealous to
preserve access to public places for purposes of free speech,, 95 the Court
has nonetheless insisted that the character of public space is often a
matter of context.96 Where there is room for disagreement (in the
meeting hall, park, street comer, or public thoroughfare), and where there
is opportunity for the unwilling recipient of someone else's
communication to look the other way (in both real and metaphorical
senses), "First Amendment values inalterably prevail., 97 The right of
others to communicate, however, must be balanced with the right of
every person to be let alone. 98 While the home remains a traditional
of similarly situated, if more familiar, religious groups. The plaintiff was 14 years old
when she joined the Hare Krishnas. The record included the following accounts of her
life with the defendants:
- All of her possessions were taken away; she was forced to plead for such
common items as shoes, clothing and health care.
- She was required to do menial labor and forced to beg for money.
- Robin was deprived of any meaningful contact with the outside world. She
was separated from the nurturing influence of family and friends; she was not
even allowed to correspond.
- Robin was deprived of the simple joys of life. She was not permitted to read
books or newspapers, view television or even listen to the radio.
- Most important, Robin was moved from place-to-place without regard to her
personal wishes.
Id. at 237. The court concluded that these acts were not tortious, observing that "[miany
of the acts relied on by [the plaintiff] are hardly uncommon among cloistered religious
groups." Id. (emphasis added).
93. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring
in the judgment).
94. 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 580 (D. Md. 2008) (quoting Guinn v. Church of Christ in
Collinsville, 775 P.2d 776, 779 (Okla. 1989)).
95. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970); see also Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); cf Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491
(1975) ("In this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of [free speech
or] free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and
significant concerns of our society.").
[Vol. 113:2
THE OUTRAGEOUS GOD
sanctuary from unwanted communications,99 "the very basic right to be
free from sights, sounds, and tangible matter we do not want" may
outweigh the right to communicate in other, less traditional settings. 00
Open spaces, in other words, may not be as open as they seem at first
glance. 0 1 In effect, we carry with us a measure of protection from
confrontational acts-when we go to and from work, 0 2 when we view
display advertising,10 3 when we use the city transit system,104 when we
seek out medical care 05-and when communication is forced upon us,
the right to be left alone must prevail. The captive audience doctrine is
often described as addressing a conflict of constitutional rights,10 6 but it
is better understood as reflecting basic common law tort principles.10 7
The common law protects against the improper revelation of private
matters; likewise, it protects privacy by providing a remedy for
99. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S 474, 485 (1988); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 748 (1976); Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.
100. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736; see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 717 ("The right to avoid
unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate
surroundings, but can also be protected in confrontational settings.") (citations omitted).
101. Cf Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 ("The recognizable privacy interest in avoiding
unwanted communication varies widely in different settings. It is far less important when
strolling through Central Park than when in the confines of one's own home, or when
persons are powerless to avoid. But even the interest in preserving tranquility in the
Sheep Meadow portion of Central Park may at times justify official restraints on
offensive musical expression.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
102. See Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204
(1921) ("How far may men go in persuasion and communication and still not violate the
right of those whom they would influence? In going to and from work, men have a right
to as free a passage without obstruction as the streets afford, consistent with the right of
others to enjoy the same privilege. We are a social people and the accosting by one of
another in an inoffensive way and an offer by one to communicate and discuss
information with a view to influencing the other's action are not regarded as aggression
or a violation of that other's rights. If, however, the offer is declined, as it may rightfully
be, then persistence, importunity, following and dogging become unjustifiable annoyance
and obstruction which is likely soon to savor of intimidation. From all of this the person
sought to be influenced has a right to be free, and his employer has a right to have him
free.").
103. See generally Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
104. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974).
105. See generally Hill, 530 U.S. at 703; Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512
U.S. 753 (1994).
106. See, e.g., Lehman, 418 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("In asking us to
force the system to accept his message as a vindication of his constitutional rights, the
petitioner overlooks the constitutional rights of the commuters. While petitioner clearly
has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen, he has no right to force his
message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it. In my view the right of
the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from
transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of
ideas upon this captive audience.").
107. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 717 n.24 (characterizing "right to avoid unwelcome speech"
as a common-law "'interest' that States can choose to protect in certain situations").
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communications thrust upon us against our will.10 8 Like privacy, the
concept of captivity is a flexible one, able to accommodate many forms
of entrapment, from the geographical to the psychological. 10 9 As such, it
can be a useful way to chart the uncertain boundary line between the
varieties of protected religious advocacy and conduct so offensive and
intrusive as to be intolerable in a civilized society.
A
The conduct of the Westboro Baptist Church at Matthew Snyder's
funeral was not the kind of religious activity protected by the Free
Exercise Clause. (The court dismissed defendants' free speech defense
as "without merit," concluding that the plaintiff was a private figure.'0)
The freedom to organize voluntary religious associations brings with it
the right of religious advocacy, the right to express and disseminate
religious doctrine."' But, the district court followed Supreme Court
precedent on two key points limiting that right. First, it distinguished
speech that is of public concern (perhaps even the "vilification of men
108. Justice Louis Brandeis was instrumental in developing both types of common
law privacy protection. His essay on the right to be left alone has been widely relied
upon for the proposition that "[t]he common law secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 198 (1890). Brandeis also wrote the opinion in Packer
Corporation v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932), which relied in part on the captive audience
doctrine. See 285 U.S. at 110 (distinguishing "forms of advertising [that] are ordinarily
seen as a matter of choice on the part of the observer" from those seen "without the
exercise of choice or volition"); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 ("The unwilling listener's
interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases.
It is an aspect of the broader 'right to be let alone' that one of our wisest Justices
characterized as 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."' (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting))).
109. For concern about the "malleability" of "the so-called 'right to be let alone' of
unwilling listeners," see William E. Lee, The Unwilling Listener: Hill v. Colorado's
Chilling Effect on Unorthodox Speech," 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 387, 413, 412-17 (2002).
110. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 576-77 (D. Md. 2008) ("[T]he Supreme
Court has recognized that there is not an absolute First Amendment right for any and all
speech directed by private individuals against other private individuals.").
11. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) ("In the realm of
religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the
tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false
statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite
of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.")
(emphasis added); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1871).
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who have been, or are, prominent in church or state"1 12) from "speech
directed by private individuals against other private individuals."'
1 3
Second, the court distinguished religious advocacy that conveyed a
general viewpoint from that which expressed particularized messages
personally directed at the Snyder family. 14 These are distinctions that
make a real constitutional difference. Quite simply, the targeted personal
attack on Matthew Snyder, a complete stranger to the defendant
church,' 5 is of negligible value in the area of social and political
discourse. But, the district court missed an opportunity to make clearer
the scope of its authority to adjudicate complaints about religiously
motivated activity. Not only did the church target a private citizen for
mere personal vilification, it did so when the grieving family was, in
effect, held captive by special circumstances. By borrowing from the
doctrinal underpinnings of the Supreme Court's "captive audience"
cases, the court could have tied the church's tort liability to conduct,
however sincerely motivated by religious belief, that personally targets
an audience unwilling to receive offensive communication and, yet,
unable to avoid it.
The Supreme Court has long held that "not all speech is of equal
First Amendment importance."" 6  While religious entities are free to
spread their message, they are not free to do so in a way that violates the
personal rights of private individuals.' 17 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the
112. Cantwell, 310U.S. at310.
113. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 570 ("The Supreme Court of the United States has
specifically held that First Amendment protection of particular types of speech must be
balanced against a state's interest in protecting its residents from wrongful injury." (citing
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974))).
114. Id. at 570, 577; cf Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) ("The type of
focused picketing prohibited by the [city] ordinance is fundamentally different from more
generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned in
residential areas.").
115. On the church's argument that the Snyder family made their son's death a matter
of public controversy, see infra note 129.
116. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985);
see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); F.C.C. v Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (content that is "vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking" is not
entitled to absolute constitutional protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) (state can lawfully punish individual for use of words "which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace").
117. Or in a way that disrupts the public peace. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (governmental regulation of conduct prompted by religious beliefs
is permissible when such conduct poses "some substantial threat to public safety, peace
or order" (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963))); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at
304 ("[A] state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation... safeguard the
peace, good order and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679, 728-29 (1871) (religious freedom includes right to express and disseminate religious
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Supreme Court considered the tension between the right of religious
advocacy and the equal right of private individuals "to the exercise of
their liberties."'1 18 Jesse Cantwell's arrest for soliciting without a license,
in violation of a Connecticut state statute regulating religious solicitation,
is a familiar enough one, as is the Court's holding that Connecticut's
regulation of religious solicitation amounted to a prior restraint on and
censorship of religion.' 19 But, Cantwell was also arrested, on common
law grounds, for invoking or inciting others to breach of the peace, and
the Court's holding on this point created a set of significant markers by
which to judge the legal limits of religious advocacy.1 20  The Court's
decision was narrowly fact-based:
The facts which were held to support the conviction of Jesse
Cantwell on [this] count were that he stopped two men in the street,
asked, and received, permission to play a phonograph record, and
played the record "Enemies," which attacked the religion and church
of the two men, who were Catholics. Both were incensed by the
contents of the record and were tempted to strike Cantwell unless he
went away. On being told to be on his way he left their presence.
There was no evidence that he was personally offensive or entered
into any argument with those he interviewed.
Acknowledging the state's authority to prevent or punish a threat to
public safety, peace, or order,122 the Court focused on these facts:
Cantwell requested permission to play the record and permission was
granted;1 23 no claim was made that Cantwell "intended to insult or
affront the hearers by playing the record," only that he wished "to
interest them in his propaganda"; 124 and Cantwell's conduct involved "no
assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional
doctrine "which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not
infringe personal rights") (emphasis added).
118. See31OU.S.at310.
119. Id. at 305 ("[Tlhe Act requires an application to the secretary of the public
welfare council of the State; that he is empowered to determine whether the cause is a
religious one, and that the issue of a certificate depends upon his affirmative action. If he
finds that the cause is not that of religion, to solicit for it becomes a crime. He is not to
issue a certificate as a matter of course. His decision to issue or refuse it involves
appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion. He is
authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that the cause is not a religious one.
Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial
of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within
the protection of the Fourteenth.").
120. Id. at 309.
121. Id. at 302-03.
122. Id. at 308.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 308-09.
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discourtesy, no personal abuse."'' 25 On these facts, the Court reasoned
that Cantwell had invaded no private right or interest because he 1) used
no coercive means to spread his message to unwilling listeners, 2 6 and
2) used no "abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer."'127
Cantwell teaches that "[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in
any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded
by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument."'128  By this measure, mere personal
vilification would not be constitutionally protected against the lesser
penalty of tort liability. When religious advocacy is used to attack
private individuals, 29 assuredly the principle of voluntariness offers no
basis for immunity from civil redress.
The constitutional safeguard against tort liability is especially
unwarranted, as Cantwell also suggests, when religious entities direct
speech at private individuals who are held captive by special
circumstances. Though "'we are often "captives" outside the sanctuary
of the home and subject to objectionable speech,"' the constitutional
commitment to open discourse "does not mean we must be captives
everywhere."1 30  The Supreme Court has unhesitatingly protected the
"unwilling listener" when protesters invade residential privacy:' 31
125. Id. at 310 ("We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm,
no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse. On the contrary, we
find only an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to contribute money in
the interest of what Cantwell, however misguided others may think him, conceived to be
true religion.") (emphasis added).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 309 (emphasis added); cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
("While the four-letter word displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft is not
uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly
not 'directed to the person of the hearer."' (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309)).
128. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-10.
129. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (2008) ("[T]his case involves ...
the rights of other private citizens to avoid being personally assaulted by outrageous
speech and comment."). The district court considered "without merit" the church's
argument that the Snyder family invited the attention of or provoked comment from the
Westboro Baptist Church. 533 F. Supp. 2d at 577. The fact that Matthew's funeral
attracted public attention does make him a public figure. "A private individual is not
automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated
with a matter that attracts public attention." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S.
157, 167 (1979). The church's reasoning would in effect nullify the Supreme Court's
precedents that establish the contours of the public figure doctrine. See Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). There
was no indication that Matthew or his family assumed a prominent role in public
controversy, see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351, or that the Snyders sought to use Matthew's
funeral "as a fulcrum to create public discussion," see Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168.
130. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
131. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
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[A] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own
walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid
intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not
required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that
the government may protect this freedom.
132
When the Court has invalidated bans on expressive activity, it has
hastened to affirm the principle that unwilling listeners may be protected
within their own homes.' 33 By analogy, the Court has applied the state's
interest in residential privacy to medical privacy.134 In both residential
and medical settings, the Court objected to the harm caused by focused
or targeted picketing as opposed to "more generally directed means of
communication."'' 35  The two types of speech are "fundamentally
different": focused picketing "do[es] not seek to disseminate a message
to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do
so in an especially offensive way."' 136 That "way" has what the Court
referred to as the "unique and subtle impact" of entrapping the target-
figuratively, if not literally--"with no ready means of avoiding the
unwanted speech."'' 37  (It is easy to see the unique impact of such
picketing. Its subtlety is a bit more elusive.) Of particular importance to
emotional distress claimants, the Court has not hesitated to protect the
psychological well-being of those who cannot escape unwanted
132. Id. at 484-85; see also, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-749
(1978); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949).
133. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 ("In Schneider [Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939)], for example, in striking down a complete ban on handbilling, we spoke of a right
to distribute literature only to one willing to receive it. Similarly, when we invalidated a
ban on door-to-door solicitation in Martin [Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943)], we did so on the basis that the home owner could protect himself from such
intrusion by an appropriate sign that he is unwilling to be disturbed. We have never
intimated that the visitor could insert a foot in the door and insist on a hearing. There
simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener.") (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
134. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) ("We conclude
that the reasoning underlying this government interest in residential privacy applies even
more convincingly to the state interest in ensuring medical privacy." (citing Operation
Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 672 (Fla. 1993))).
135. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486; cf Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 769
(1994) ("We have noted a distinction between the type of focused picketing banned from
the buffer zone and the type of generally disseminated communication that cannot be
completely banned in public places, such as handbilling and solicitation.").
136. 487 U.S. at 486; cf Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972) (Powell,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he exception to First Amendment protection recognized in Chaplinsky
is not limited to words whose mere utterance entails a [call to violence]. It also extends
to the willful use of scurrilous language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an
unwilling audience.").
137. 487 U.S. at 487.
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speech.138  "[W]hile targeted picketing of the home threatens the
psychological well-being of the 'captive' resident, targeted picketing of a
hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but also the
physical, well-being of the patient held 'captive' by medical
circumstance. 1 39  Other courts have extended the "captive listener"
principle to houses of worship 140 and funerals.
141
138. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768.
139. Id. (citing Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 672 (Fla.
1993)); see also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the psychological tensions and pressures that result
from targeted residential picketing) (citing City of Wauwatosa v. King, 182 N.W.2d 530,
537 (Wis. 1971)).
140. St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, 921 P.2d 821, 830
(Kan. Ct. App. 1996) ("[I]n addition to the government interest in protecting residential
and clinical privacy, the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of
one's place of worship as well."); cf Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 681 n.10 (N.D.
Tex. 1998) ("The Court is troubled by the notion that a person may be subjected to
focused picketing at their place of worship. Indeed, the right to engage in quiet and
reflective prayer without being subjected to unwarranted intrusion is an essential
component of freedom of religion. The government certainly has a significant interest in
protecting this important First Amendment right."). But see Olmer v. City of Lincoln,
192 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Allowing other locations, even churches, to claim
the same level of constitutionally protected privacy [as residences] would, we think,
permit government to prohibit too much speech and other communication.").
141. See Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619 (N.D. Ohio 2007) ("Because
the mourners are a captive audience unable to avoid communications simply by averting
their eyes, the Court finds that the State of Ohio has a significant interest in protecting its
citizens from disruption during the events associated with a funeral or burial service.");
McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006) ("A funeral is a deeply
personal, emotional and solemn occasion. Its attendees have an interest in avoiding
unwanted, obtrusive communications which is at least similar to a person's interest in
avoiding such communications inside his home. Further, like medical patients entering a
medical facility, funeral attendees are captive.") (emphasis added); cf National Archives
& Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004) ("Family members have a
personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public
exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect
they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their own."). But see Phelps-
Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 486-87 (8th Cir. 2007) (no significant state interest in
protecting funeral attendees). On the constitutionality of funeral picketing statutes, see
Kara Beil, Note, Funeral Protest Bans: Do They Kill Speech or Resurrect Respect for the
Dead?, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 503 (2008); Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws
and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 575 (2007); Robert F. McCarthy, Note, The
Incompatibility of Free Speech and Funerals: A Grayned-Based Approach for Funeral
Protest Statutes, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1469 (2007); Lauren M. Miller, Comment, A Funeral
for Free Speech?: Examining the Constitutionality of Funeral Picketing Acts, 44 Hous.
L. REV. 1097 (2007); Cynthia Mosher, Comment, What They Died to Defend: Freedom
of Speech and Military Funeral Protests, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587 (2007); Katherine A.
Ritts, Note, The Constitutionality of "Let Them Rest in Peace" Bills: Can Governments
Say "Not Today, Fred" to Demonstrations at Funeral Ceremonies?, 58 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 137 (2007); Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free
Speech Against the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295 (2008);
see also Volokh, supra note 8.
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The Constitution did not require the Snyder family to welcome
unwanted speech of a personally abusive nature into the sanctuary set
aside for a moment of private bereavement. No one could reasonably
have regarded the church's words as anything other than "a direct
personal insult,"'' 42 though "delivered in the milieu of religious
practice."' 143 If the Snyders could have avoided "bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes,"'144 the words and actions of
the Westboro Baptist Church would possibly warrant the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause. But, funeral attendees are captive in a way that
deserves the same recognition afforded the resident in his or her home, or
the patient in a medical facility. 45 The Snyder court should have more
explicitly drawn upon the principle of constitutional captivity and thus
more exactly defined the threshold-the line where the unwilling listener
is compelled to endure a targeted personal attack-separating protected
from unprotected religious advocacy. The Supreme Court has said that
"[a]s a general matter,.., in public debate our own citizens must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide 'adequate
"breathing space" to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment,"" 146 but hurtful speech, when directed at private individuals
unable to avoid exposure to it, 147 hardly merits constitutional protection,
even when that speech is enmeshed with matters of public import.
Where substantial privacy interests are invaded in an intolerable
manner, 48 tort liability for emotional distress provides a mechanism-a
flexible (yet narrowly tailored 49) alternative to governmental
142. Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("No individual actually or
likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a
direct personal insult.").
143. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
144. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21; see also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
209-11 (1975) (absent degree of captivity that makes it impractical to avoid exposure,
burden "normally falls" on viewer to avert his eyes).
145. See supra note 25.
146. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)) (holding "that public figures and
public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress"
without showing that "a false statement of fact ... was made with actual malice").
147. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 (restrictions on speech are valid when "the
degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid
exposure").
148. See id. at 209-10 ("'The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution,
to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is... dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner."' (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21) (alteration in original)).
149. Cf Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 61 (1988) ("[T]o allow injured
parties to bring private actions for fraud is the least restrictive means available for
advancing the state's interest in protecting individuals and families from the harmful
effects of fraudulent recruitment.").
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regulationl 50-that can shut off outrageous discourse (or make speakers
pay for the severe emotional distress that their words inflict) while
ensuring a robust marketplace for religious ideas.
The outcome of Snyder v. Phelps was determined by the applicable
principles of tort law. There was no intra-church dispute, and, thus, the
court properly avoided the kinds of questions that entangle courts in
controversies internal to religious entities. The court made no judgment
about the truth or falsity of the church's religious beliefs; it passed no
judgment about the relative merits of the church's religious viewpoint.
The district court considered the only question it was permitted to
consider; and, with no offense to core constitutional principles, it decided
that the conduct of the Westboro Baptist Church was of a type that no
decent society should tolerate.
B
The "captivity" of the Snyder family was limited in time and place,
a geographical constraint not unlike those in the Court's residential and
medical privacy (and other captive audience) cases. Some courts have
been confronted with captivity of a psychological sort, the kind of
incapacity to make decisions that may afflict those who endure coercive
indoctrination techniques. 15' In Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass 'n, the plaintiffs
contended that "the Church's agents had rendered them incapable of
deciding not to join the Church, by subjecting them, without their
knowledge or consent, to an intense program of coercive persuasion or
mind control.' ' 152 "[By] the time the church disclosed its true identity,"
the plaintiffs argued, "their involuntary indoctrination was
accomplished.' ' 5 3 The state supreme court held that whether the church,
through its indoctrination regimen, had brainwashed the plaintiffs was a
triable issue of fact, thus precluding summary judgment on the emotional
150. Compare Rowan v. U. S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (residents
may give mailer notice that they wish no further mailings), with Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (government may not prohibit unsolicited mailing of
contraceptive advertisements).
151. On coercive indoctrination techniques, see generally MARK GALANTER, CULTS:
FAITH, HEALING, AND COERCION (1989); JOHN LOFLAND, DOOMSDAY CULT: A STUDY OF
CONVERSION, PROSELYTIZATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF FAITH (1966); THOMAS ROBBINS,
CULTS, CONVERTS, AND CHARISMA: THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS
(1988); CULTS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW: PERSPECTIVES ON NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS
(Thomas Robbins et al. eds., 1985); A. JAMES RUDIN & MARCIA R. RUDIN, PRISON OR
PARADISE?: THE NEW RELIGIOUS CULTS (1980); Richard Delgado, Religious Totalism:
Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1977).
152. 762 P.2d at 54.
153. Id.
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distress claim.154  Though brainwashing remains a controversial
theory,155 more than a few courts have recognized that coercive
persuasion in religious settings may vitiate consent.
56
However controversial brainwashing is, the idea that aggressive
religious indoctrination can have a captivating influence on children is
hardly to be questioned. 157 The Supreme Court has long recognized that
young people are peculiarly vulnerable to outside influences, 158 that
"minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."'
159
Indeed, the Court has on more than one occasion asserted the need to
regulate "otherwise protected expression" in light of the special
sensitivities of children. 160 In some areas of the law, "a child [is] like
154. Id. at 61-62.
155. Id. at 54.
156. See, e.g., Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980) ("Coercive
persuasion is fostered through the creation of a controlled environment that heightens the
susceptibility of a subject to suggestion and manipulation through sensory deprivation,
physiological depletion, cognitive dissonance, peer pressure, and a clear assertion of
authority and dominion. The aftermath of indoctrination is a severe impairment of
autonomy and the ability to think independently, which induces a subject's unyielding
compliance and the rupture of past connections, affiliations and associations."); see also
Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988); Wollersheim v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d I (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Katz v. Superior Court, 141
Cal. Rptr. 234 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 589 F. Supp. 10 (D.
Mass. 1983); Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt. 1977); Meroni v.
Holy Spirit Ass'n, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984).
157. On children's religious development, see generally ROBERT COLES, THE
SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN passim (Houghton Mifflin 1990); JAMES W. FOWLER,
STAGES OF FAITH: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE QUEST FOR
MEANING passim (Harper & Row 1981); THE HANDBOOK OF SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT IN
CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE passim (Eugene C. Roehlkepartain et al. eds., Sage
Publications 2005); CHRISTIAN SMITH, SOUL SEARCHING: THE RELIGIOUS AND SPIRITUAL
LIVES OF AMERICAN TEENAGERS passim (Oxford Univ. Press 2005); Emily Buss, The
Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1223,
1264-67 (2000); Note, Children as Believers: Minors' Free Exercise Rights and the
Psychology of Religious Development, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2205, 2220-25 (2002).
158. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (citing McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) ("Viewed together, our cases show that although
children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability.")).
159. Id. at 635.
160. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (government's interest in
well-being of youth justifies regulation of otherwise protected expression); Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The State's interest in protecting a young
person from harm justifies the imposition of restraints on his or her freedom even though
comparable restraints on adults would be constitutionally impermissible."); see also
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (householder should not have
to risk that offensive material may come into the hands of his children); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) ("[E]ven where there is an invasion of protected
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someone in a captive audience"--not possessed of the full capacity for
individual choicel 61-and "the State has an interest 'to protect the
welfare of children' and to see that they are 'safeguarded from abuses'
which might prevent their 'growth into free and independent well-
developed men and citizens.' ' 162  One of those possible abuses is
aggressive religious advocacy. Children lack the capacity to assert, or to
choose not to assert, a personal religious identity. They are, one might
say, spiritually captive to the will of others. "[P]arents and religious
leaders define a child's religious identity under the rules of the religion
they practice. Often such rules impose a presumed religious identity
upon a child without requiring the child's consent or understanding. 163
Thus, those in charge of a child's religious upbringing assume what
amounts to a spiritual fiduciary duty, at least until the child is mature
enough to assert a legally cognizable religious identity. 164 The contours
of that duty are, as one might expect, hotly contested, 165 but as with any
other fiduciary duty, the law must offer a remedy for gross breaches of
spiritual caretaking. 166 It is axiomatic that the state has an independent
freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults."' (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170
(1944))); cf May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("[C]hildren have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories
and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically
transferred to determination of a State's duty towards children.").
161. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote
omitted).
162. Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 165).
163. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1148-49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
164. See id. at 1149 ("In order to avoid arrogating to itself unconstitutional authority
to declare orthodoxy in determining religious identity, courts only recognize a legally
cognizable religious identity when such an identity is asserted by the child itself, and then
only if the child has reached sufficient maturity and intellectual development to
understand the significance of such an assertion. Though no uniform age of discretion is
set, children twelve or older are generally considered mature enough to assert a religious
identity, while children eight and under are not. With those ranges as a starting point,
judges exercise broad discretion on a case by case basis in determining whether a child
has sufficient capacity to assert for itself a personal religious identity.").
165. Compare JOEL FEINBERG, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE
CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (William
Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980), with Shelley Burtt, The Proper Scope ofAuthority:
Why We Don 't Owe Children an Open Future, in CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 243
(Stephen Macedo & Iris Marion Young eds., 2003).
166. On the fiduciary duty of religious entities to their members, see Dan B. Dobbs,
Undertakings and Special Relationships in Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 49, 67-68 (2008). Claims for breach of fiduciary duty arise
most often in sexual misconduct and pastoral counseling cases. See, e.g., Zanita E.
Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 45 (2001); Zshonette Reed, Clergy Malpractice: Defining the Duty and
Dismissing the Claim, 4 J. LEGAL ADvoc. & PRAc. 122 (2002); Marjorie A. Shields,
Liability of Church or Religious Organization for Negligent Hiring, Retention, or
2008]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
interest in the welfare of young people.1 67 It should be equally clear that
where the indoctrination of minors causes serious emotional harm, the
state may secure that interest by imposing tort liability upon religious
entities.
Oddly enough, the law does provide a remedy against outrageous
religious indoctrination for those children whose world has already been
shattered by domestic conflict, for children whose parents, having
divorced, find themselves unable to agree on the spiritual upbringing of
their minor children. 168  Where conflict generated by religious
differences may result in harm to the child, courts do place limits on
parental religious rights, including the right to expose children to
religious advocacy. 16 9 This is especially true in cases where one parent
Supervision of Priest, Minister, or Other Clergy Based on Sexual Misconduct, 101
A.L.R.5th 1 (2002); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM
§ 40 cmt. I (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (school's duty of care to students derives, in
part, from fact that schools function in place of parents).
167. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976) ("The Court indeed, however, long has recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults."); Ginsberg, 390
U.S. at 640 ("The State also has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth.");
Prince, 221 U.S. at 168 ("A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers, within a broad range
of selection.").
168. On the constitutional implications of spiritual custody cases, see generally, for
example, Jennifer Ann Dobrac, For the Sake of the Children: Court Consideration of
Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1609, 1620 (1998); Michael Loatman,
Note, Protecting the Best Interests of the Child and Free Exercise Rights of the Family,
13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 89 (2006); Collin Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best
Interest May Be Unconstitutional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15
CREIGHTON L. REV. 25 (1981); Jordan C. Paul, Comment, "You Get the House. I Get the
Car. You Get the Kids. I Get Their Souls. " The Impact of Spiritual Custody Awards on
the Free Exercise Right of Custodial Parents, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 583 (1989); Carl E.
Schneider, Religion and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879 (1992); Jeffrey
Shulman, Spiritual Custody: Relational Rights and Constitutional Commitments, 7 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 317 (2005); Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody
Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702
(1984).
169. See, e.g., Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1154-55 ("The vast majority of courts addressing
this issue, before and after Morris, have concluded that each parent must be free to
provide religious exposure and instruction, as that parent sees fit, during any and all
period of legal custody or visitation without restriction, unless the challenged beliefs or
conduct of the parent are demonstrated to present a substantial threat of present or future,
physical or emotional harm to the child in absence of the proposed restriction.") (citing
cases); In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("[I]n the
majority of American jurisdictions that have considered the question, the courts have
refused to restrain the noncustodial parent from exposing the minor child to his or her
religious beliefs and practices, absent a clear, affirmative showing that these religious
activities will be harmful to the child.") (citing cases). See generally George L. Blum,
Annotation, Religion as Factor in Child Custody Cases, 124 A.L.R. 5th 203 (2004);
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uses religious beliefs to alienate a child's affections from the other
parent. 1
70
Kendall v. Kendall is a telling example of the potentially damaging
psychological consequences of religious advocacy. 71 In Kendall, the
state supreme court upheld restrictions on the father's right to "share his
religious beliefs with the children if those beliefs cause the children
significant emotional distress or worry."'172 The mother was an orthodox
Jew. The father was a member of the Boston Church of Christ, a
fundamentalist Christian faith. The trial court concluded that substantial
harm to the children had been demonstrated based on the following
findings, among others:
* The Boston Church of Christ taught that those who do not
accept the church's faith are damned to go to hell, where
there will be "weeping and gnashing of teeth."
* The oldest child concluded that his mother may go to hell, a
prospect that caused him "substantial worry and upset."
* The father fostered negative and distorted images of the
Jewish culture. He insisted that people who do not accept
his beliefs "are sinners who are destined to tortuous
punishment."
* The children were likely to "experience choosing a religion
as choosing between [their] parents, a task that is likely to
cause [them] significant emotional distress." In fact, the
children were "perilously close to being forced to choose
between their parents, and to reject one."
* If the children were to accept their father's beliefs, "they are
likely to come to view their mother negatively and as a
person who will be punished for her sins," a result that, to
the children's "substantial detriment," would make it
difficult to accept "guidance and nurturance" from her.1
73
The evidence was sufficient to convince the court that "[the
defendant's] religion may alienate the children from their custodial
parent (she is bad, she will burn in hell), and may diminish their own
sense of self-worth and self-identity (Jews are bad, Jews will bum in
George L. Blum, Annotation, Religion as Factor in Visitation Cases, 95 A.L.R. 5th 533
(2002).
170. See generally, e.g., Jeffrey Shulman, What Yoder Wrought: Religious
Disparagement, Parental Alienation and the Best Interests of the Child, 53 VILL. L. REv.
173 (2008).
171. 687 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. 1997).
172. Id. at 1231; see also LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1990) (upholding
prohibition of a child's exposure to parent's religion where a child psychologist found the
child suffered from "serious" stress).
173. 687 N.E.2d at 1233-35 (alterations in original).
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hell);"'7 4 and the threat of such harm was substantial enough to justify a
judgment that significantly interfered with the father's freedom to
convey his religious beliefs to his own children:
The [defendant] shall not take the children to his church (whether to
church services or Sunday School or church educational programs),
nor engage them in prayer or bible study if it promotes rejection
rather than acceptance, of their mother or their own Jewish self-
identity. The [defendant] shall not share his religious beliefs with the
children if those beliefs cause the children significant emotional
distress or worry about their mother or about themselves.'75
Thus, for example, the father could have pictures of Jesus Christ hanging
on the walls of his residence, but he could not take the children to
religious services where they would receive "the message that adults or
children who do not accept Jesus Christ as their lord and savior are
destined to bum in hell."'
176
The Kendall court rightly focused its inquiry on objective measures
of emotional and psychological harm to the children,177 not the merit or
worthiness of the parents' religious teachings. 78 While the substantial
harm standard may not provide children the full measure of protection
children need,179 it does set an outer limit to the right of religious
174. Id. at 1235.
175. Id. at 1231 (emphasis added). Illustrating the predilection of courts "to question
the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith," Hernandez v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989), the Kendall court concluded that "the
divorce judgment is limited in scope and imposes a minimal burden on the defendant's
right to practice religion by requiring only that he limit sharing certain aspects of his
beliefs with his children." 687 N.E.2d at 1236.
176. 687N.E.2dat 1231.
177. See id. at 1233 (noting that "[t]he GAL's report was based on interviews with the
parents, the children, and the children's teachers, psychological tests, and observations of
the children interacting with both parents"); see also LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d at 5 ("There is
ample evidence to conclude that the stress [child] was experiencing posed an immediate
and substantial threat to his well-being. The stress that [child] was experiencing was
neither hypothetical nor tenuous."); cf Goldstein, supra note 36, at 502-03 ("[P]ositive
religious questions, such as those concerning the content of religious beliefs or the
importance of a religious practice within the context of a religion, do not call on courts to
employ anything other than ordinary tools of judicial fact-finding and can be resolved
through resort to traditional evidence, such as reliance on expert witnesses, treatises, and
factual testimony.").
178. See 687 N.E.2d at 1236 (restriction on father's right to share religious belief with
his children "does not foster excessive government entanglement because the focus of
any judicial inquiry will center on the emotional or physical harm to the children rather
than the merit or worthiness of the parties' respective religious teachings").
179. See generally Shulman, supra notes 168, 170 (arguing that harm standard fails to
protect the best interests of the child); cf Kendall, 687 N.E.2d at 1232-33 ("Very few
[cases] have actually ruled that substantial harm had been demonstrated.") (collecting
cases).
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advocacy in the custody context. But it makes no sense to apply that
standard where the family unit has been ruptured and, yet, not to protect
children from aggressive religious indoctrination in other contexts. The
courts assume that fit parents act in the best interests of their children,
80
but no such favorable presumption exists for religious advocates who
proselytize to children too young to define, let alone assert, their own
spiritual preferences, children who may be especially susceptible to
influences of a religious character.'88
Tort liability for emotional distress complements other measures
that protect children. The state would intervene if religious beliefs or
practices endangered the physical health or safety of a child. 182 The state
would intervene if solely secular conditions endangered the emotional
health of a child. 8 3 But in cases where minors claim that indoctrination
techniques caused emotional distress, judicial concern about becoming
embroiled in what would amount to a heresy trial has limited
consideration of religious matters. In Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New
England, for example, the defendant church objected to testimony about
its religious doctrine, arguing that tort liability amounted to punishment
for religious heterodoxy.' 84 The state supreme court agreed and barred
what it considered to be an impermissible evaluation of the defendant's
religious beliefs: "The essence of what occurred in the trial is that the
plaintiffs were allowed to suggest to the jury extensively that exposure to
the defendant's religious beliefs was sufficient to cause tortious
emotional damage. . . ., " No defendant, the court opined, should be
forced to prove "that the substance of its religious beliefs is worthy of
respect."'
86
The Murphy court cited Madsen v. Erwin for the proposition that
adjudication of a claim was barred where such inquiry would "involve
180. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 602 (1979)) ("[N]atural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children."). On parental rights to determine a child's religious upbringing, see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ("[T]he values of parental direction of the
religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years
have a high place in our society."); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 157-67.
182. See, e.g., People v. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1992) (failure to report child abuse not protected conduct under the First Amendment,
even if motivated by sincere religious belief); In re Interest of T.M.B., 491 N.W.2d 58
(Neb. 1992) (abusive discipline not protected under Free Exercise Clause).
183. See, e.g., Josephine B. v. Alaska, Dep't of Health and Social Services, 174 P.3d
217, 223 (Alaska 2008) (parent caused emotional harm and mental injury by subjecting
children to "to a chronic, pervasive climate of fear").
184. 571 N.E.2d 340, 345 (Mass. 1991).
185. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 348.
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the court in a review of an essentially ecclesiastical procedure. '  But
while the Madsen v. Erwin court thought that review of intra-church
employment procedures would require consideration of religious
doctrine (and, thus, was constitutionally impermissible),188 the court
allowed the plaintiff to replead her tort claims, stating that "[u]nder the
banner of the First Amendment provisions on religion, a clergyman may
not with impunity defame a person, intentionally inflict serious
emotional harm on a parishioner, or commit other torts."' 189
For the Murphy court, the key question-really, the only question-
was whether plaintiffs' testimony related to conduct or belief.1 90 The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that religious teaching is activity,
not belief: "Inherent in the claim that exposure to [defendant's] religious
beliefs causes tortious emotional damage is the notion that the disputed
beliefs are fundamentally flawed."'1 91 But, whether or not the defendants'
beliefs were, in fact, "fundamentally flawed" was really irrelevant. 92 To
borrow from the law of evidence, the court did not need to decide the
truth of the matter asserted. 193 The legal question was not whether the
female form is truly evil (as the church taught), 94 but whether the minor
plaintiff could show that the church was subject to tort liability for
indoctrinating her in this belief (among others). That liability could arise
from conduct or belief. While most outrage claims focus on the method
of indoctrination, the lesson of Kendall, and parental alienation cases in
general, is that the content of religious teaching, regardless of its truth or
falsity, can also cause substantial harm. A religious entity is free to
espouse and teach what it will, but it should not be free, and the
187. Id. at 350 (citing Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1166 (Mass. 1985)).
188. Madsen, 481 N.E. 2d at 1165-66.
189. Id. at 1167 (plaintiff's complaint alleged defamation, interference with
advantageous relations, interference with employment contract, invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
190. Id.
191. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, 571 N.E.2d 340, 348 (Mass. 1991).
192. Cf Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762
P.2d 46, 59 (Cal. 1988) ("[T]he legal question here does not require a court to determine
whether anyone's faith, current or past, is or was real .... The legal question is simply
whether a religious organization can be held liable on a traditional cause of action in
fraud for deceiving nonmembers into subjecting themselves, without their knowledge or
consent, to coercive persuasion."); Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Mass.
1997) ("[T]he focus of any judicial inquiry will center on the emotional or physical harm
to the children rather than the merit or worthiness of the parties' respective religious
teachings.").
193. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c). In Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980),
the plaintiff, a member of a religious group called The Way, was held against her will as
part of a deprogramming episode, and she sued for false imprisonment. The court ruled
that evidence of The Way's activities and practices was admissible to show defendants'
state of mind (which was a question relevant to the assessment of punitive damages).
194. See Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 346.
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Constitution does not require that it must be free, from tort liability when
its indoctrination of children-who, after all, are not free to reject that
indoctrination-amounts to the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
The possibility of viewpoint discrimination in emotional distress
cases is a real one, and courts should abstain from adjudicating intra-
church disputes or evaluating the worthiness of religious belief.
However, the state has a compelling interest in providing its citizens a
remedy against outrageous conduct. In most cases, it may be that the
advocacy of religious beliefs will fail to satisfy the elements of an
emotional distress claim. It may well be that "intangible or emotional
harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of
action against a church for its practices,"' 95 but the emotional distress
claim protects against conduct that is by definition extraordinary in
character. To not provide a remedy in exceptional circumstances would
be to allow every religious entity to become a law unto itself.
196
Of course, the state has an equally compelling interest in creating a
civil space where robust religious advocacy and debate can flourish. By
restricting those claims to circumstances where religious advocacy
targets a captive and private listener, the courts can provide a remedy for
truly outrageous conduct without harm to the public discourse and
without fear of sacrificing First Amendment freedoms. Indeed, such a
standard for adjudicating emotional distress claims can help create a
civic order that provides the freedom to disseminate religious beliefs and
the equal freedom to avoid unwanted and offensive religious advocacy.
195. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.
1987).
196. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) ("Can a man excuse
his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief?. To permit this would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only
in name under such circumstances.").
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